Migration and Human Rights – Exposing the Universality of Human Rights as a False Premise by Larking, Emma
45 Critical Perspectives on Migration in the Twenty-First Century
3
Migration and Human Rights 
– Exposing the Universality of 
Human Rights as a False 
Premise
EMMA LARKING
In the twenty-first century, the ability to migrate to some country other than 
one’s own, and to enjoy in that country legal status akin to that of a citizen, is 
a global marker of privilege. Such freedom is accorded only to a small class 
of people. For Bauman (1998, 9), international mobility is now the world’s 
‘most powerful and most coveted stratifying factor’ (as cited in Castles 2005, 
217). 
In Castles’s account (2005), there exist hierarchies of citizenship based on 
how much international freedom of movement a country’s passport provides 
and the degree to which the rights of its citizens are recognised at home and 
abroad. On this basis he identifies five tiers of citizenship, with citizens of the 
US occupying the first tier; citizens of other highly developed countries the 
second; citizens of transitional and newly industrialising countries the third; 
and citizens of less developed countries the fourth tier. In the fifth tier, Castles 
includes members of failed states, stateless people and a group he refers to 
as ‘non-citizens’, whose residence status where they live is irregular or 
unlawful. While we might quibble with the details – for example, placing 
citizens of the US in the top tier ignores the inability of the country’s poorer 
citizens to access rights in their own country and material constraints on their 
ability to migrate – this taxonomy makes it clear that the universal enjoyment 
of human rights is heavily circumscribed. It suggests rights realisation 
correlates strongly with privileged categories of citizenship. 
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Remarking that rights realisation is linked to citizenship of just a few states 
draws into question what the instruments of international human rights law 
describe as ‘beyond question’ – the universality of human rights (Vienna 
Declaration, para. 1). While accepting the reality of widespread rights 
violations, supporters of the international human rights system argue it is 
designed to ensure that one day all human beings will enjoy all human rights. 
In the words of a former UN Special Rapporteur on Non-Citizens, ‘[t]he 
architecture of international human rights law is built on the premise that all 
persons, by virtue of their essential humanity, should enjoy all human rights’ 
(Weissbrodt [2003] in Larking 2016, 201). In fact, however, the architecture of 
international human rights law is built on the premise of sovereignty, which 
accords states freedom from external interference and equal standing and 
authority within a global society of states (Larking 2014, 144).1 As such, the 
international human rights regime assumes that individuals enjoy human 
rights – if they do so at all – primarily by virtue of their membership of some 
rights-recognising state. This suggests there are structural impediments to 
universalising human rights that are downplayed by many international law 
scholars and human rights practitioners.
By comparison, international relations scholars tend to emphasise the 
centrality of sovereignty as a structuring principle of international law.2 Some 
also take the claimed universality of human rights seriously and suggest its 
theoretical import is to fundamentally qualify sovereignty. In the late 1970s, 
Hedley Bull (1977, 146) suggested that ‘[c]arried to its logical extreme, the 
doctrine of human rights and duties under international law is subversive of 
the whole principle that mankind should be organised as a society of states’ 
(as cited in Noll 2000, 82–3). In a similar vein, in the 1990s many cosmop-
olitan political theorists described the world as moving towards an era in 
which the universal realisation of rights might become possible in the form of 
‘post-national’ or ‘de-territorialised’ rights (see Stasiulis 1997, 198 citing 
Jacobsen 1996; Sassen 1996; Soysal 1994). Although not presaging the 
demise of the sovereign state, they took the European Union as an exemplar 
and suggested that citizenship was no longer a privileged category or 
precondition for rights recognition. They pointed to ‘new forms of post-
1  I have previously developed versions of this argument in Larking 2004; 2014, ch. 8; 
and 2016. See also Larking 2012, 72–3.
2  While noting Falk’s assessment that the concept of sovereignty is – as Mayall 
couches it – ‘in such deep trouble that its use should be left to politicians but discarded 
in serious academic analysis’, Mayall points out that ‘[t]he formal order of international 
society continues to be provided, in the main, by the collectivity of sovereign states’ 
(1999, 474). Characterisations of sovereignty as the foundational structuring principle of 
international law is consistent with widespread scepticism about the degree to which it 
reliably constrains state behaviour – see Jack Goldsmith’s account of this prevailing 
scepticism (2000, 959–61).
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national membership and rights, protected by international human rights 
provisions…and increasingly accepted and indeed organised by nation states’ 
(Stasiulis 1997).
Yet in a world in which strident nationalism is resurgent, political parties that 
vilify migrants are gaining ground,3 and states that once viewed themselves 
as ‘settler societies’ no longer see the incorporation of migrants as 
fundamental to nation building (see Dauvergne 2016), it is becoming clearer 
that individuals without access to a privileged category of citizenship are 
individuals without human rights. 
After detailing how international law ties human rights to membership in 
rights-recognising states, I discuss the normative heft of sovereignty, locating 
it in the principle of political self-determination. I argue that recognising a 
qualified right to international freedom of movement and placing corres-
ponding limits on how states police their borders would do more for political 
self-determination than continued deference to the principle of sovereignty in 
the instruments of human rights and in international frameworks governing 
migration. Re-casting human rights along these lines may be achieved by the 
advocacy of citizens within rights-recognising states, combined with 
international pressure from coalitions of states whose residents are most 
disadvantaged by the current global institutional order. In order to promote 
mobilisations in this direction, clarity is necessary about the role currently 
played by human rights instruments in upholding an outdated conception of 
sovereignty.
How International Human Rights Recognise and Uphold the Principle of 
Sovereignty
The international human rights regime is based on multilateral declarations 
and treaties between states that have bound themselves to recognise the 
rights contained therein. There is nothing unusual about states as sovereign 
entities entering into multilateral arrangements that constrain their future 
behaviour. In the case of human rights instruments, however, sovereignty is 
preserved as a structuring principle, with only minimal constraints imposed 
and the freedom of states in relation to border controls protected. The 
regime’s foundational instruments specify that rights should be exercised in a 
3  The election of Donald Trump in the United States and Britain’s decision to leave 
the EU are two of the more notable examples reflecting a resurgence in xenophobic 
nationalism. Regarding the growing popularity of anti-immigrant parties in Europe, see 
Chakelian 2017 and Adler 2016. While Adler accepts there has been a rise of 
nationalism and anti-immigrant sentiment in Europe, she denies this is evidence of a 
recent lurch to the far-right.
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manner consistent with the UN’s ‘purposes and principles’ (Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 29(3)) which include the sovereign equality 
of all Member States (Charter of the UN, Art. 2(1)). With the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) constitute an international bill of rights, 
specifying all the key human rights. Although primarily dedicated to individual 
rights, article 1 of both Covenants affirms that ‘all peoples have the right to 
self-determination’, allowing them to ‘freely determine their political status’, 
‘freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development’, and ‘freely 
dispose of their natural wealth and resources’. I discuss the relationship 
between peoples, self-determination, and sovereignty in the next section.
As well as upholding sovereignty and self-determination, the international bill 
of rights imposes obligations on states to protect without discrimination the 
rights of all individuals subject to their jurisdiction or on their territory (ICCPR, 
Art. 2(1)). Discrimination on the basis of national or social origin is illegitimate 
(ICCPR, Art. 2(1) and ICESCR, Art. 2(2)).4 This would seem to imply that 
people living in a state that fails to protect their rights are free to migrate to 
another rights-recognising state, but in fact no human rights instrument 
accords a right to international freedom of movement. States are entitled to 
control their borders (Noll 2000, 13) and the sovereign right of states to refuse 
territorial access or deny naturalisation to non-citizen residents is not 
questioned by international human rights bodies (Guiraudon and Lahav 2000, 
168). States determine the conditions for lawful residence and treat 
individuals who do not comply with these conditions as unlawfully present. 
Despite explicitly opposing discrimination, if a person is unlawfully present, 
international human rights instruments allow that their rights can be qualified. 
Most significantly, they can be detained and deported. This means they are 
unlikely to make themselves known to authorities in order to claim other rights 
to which they may theoretically be entitled, or to protest rights violations 
(Larking 2014, 132). 
The sovereign control that states exercise over matters related to 
membership has been treated by the European Court of Human Rights as 
qualifying the rights even of native born or long-standing non-citizen 
residents. This is telling because the Court is widely celebrated as uncoupling 
human rights recognition from national status and curtailing the sovereign 
4  With these qualifications: developing countries may determine to what extent they 
guarantee economic rights to non-nationals (ICESCR, Art. 2(3)), and non-citizens do 
not have rights of political participation (ICCPR, Art. 25). Note as well that the 
International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination does 
‘not apply to distinctions, exclusion, restrictions or preferences…between citizens and 
non-citizens’ (Art.1(2)).
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autonomy of EU Member States. Yet in a number of cases, the Court has 
found that the deportation of non-citizen residents who have committed 
crimes does not breach their human rights. In hundreds of other cases it has 
refused even to consider the question, ruling challenges to deportation orders 
inadmissible (see Dembour 2003).5
The right to seek asylum in article 14(1) of the UDHR has not prevented 
states from constructing elaborate border control regimes to prevent asylum 
seekers accessing their territory. These regimes have been treated as ‘within 
the letter, if not the spirit’ of international law (Goodwin-Gill and McAdam 
2007, 360) and the UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 
(‘Refugees Convention’) itself recognises that an asylum seeker’s presence in 
a Convention state may be unlawful (Art. 31(2)). While parties to the 
Refugees Convention should consider protection claims of asylum seekers 
who arrive on their territory, and afford protection to those who have a well-
founded fear of persecution in their home state,6 in practice this protection is 
afforded to a tiny percentage of refugees globally.7 It offers little comfort, 
moreover, to those people impelled to migrate because of poverty or 
starvation, war or civil conflict, or environmental disaster. In the remainder of 
this chapter, I use the expression ‘forced migrants’ to refer to both Convention 
refugees and people who migrate for any of the reasons just listed.8
The Normative Defence of Sovereignty
Given it is states that are parties to international human rights treaties, it is 
not surprising that these treaties should preserve state sovereignty. But that 
they do so is not regarded merely as marking the limits of the possible in 
international relations. Rather, it is defended on the basis that sovereignty is a 
5  See Guiraudon and Lahav (2000, 169) for an account of the few cases in which the 
Court ruled against the legality of deportation on the basis deportation would breach the 
right to family life or to protection against inhuman or degrading treatment.
6  To qualify for protection under the Refugees Convention as amended by its 1967 
Protocol, the reasons for persecution must relate to a person’s race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion (Art. 1). 
7  Border controls prevent most refugees from leaving the region in which their home 
state is located and thus from accessing protection under the Convention. Official 
resettlement programs for refugees are also very limited. In 2015, the UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees estimated there were 21.3 million refugees and another 44 
million forcibly displaced people worldwide. In the same year, 107,100 refugees were 
resettled (UNHCR 2015). 
8  As indicated above (fn 6), the Refugees Convention defines the term ‘refugee’ 
restrictively, requiring a person to be outside his or her country of nationality and unable 
to return to it ‘owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, 
religion [etc.]’ (Art. 1(2)).
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good in itself, and desirable from the perspective of human rights on the basis 
that it supports political self-determination. As we saw earlier, this concept is 
equated in the international bill of rights with the freedom of peoples to 
‘determine their political status’, ‘pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development’ (ICCPR and ICESCR, Art. 1(1)), and ‘dispose of their natural 
wealth and resources’ (ICCPR and ICESCR, Art. 1(2)). The claim that 
sovereignty supports political self-determination is true only in a very limited 
sense. The boundaries of all current states are based on histories of violence 
and dispossession, and most are host to a number of different national, 
cultural and ethnic groups – some of which view themselves as politically 
autonomous or as deserving of political autonomy. 
In international law, however, the self-determination principle has been 
treated primarily as applying to existing states and to the overseas colonies of 
the European imperial powers (Mayall 1999, 481). Appeals to self-
determination have not proved effective as a more general route to sovereign 
autonomy – international recognition of sovereignty tends to follow in the 
aftermath of successful secessionist struggles rather than to support them. 
And while the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples includes a 
right to self-determination, this is heavily qualified. Rather than being 
correlated with the exercise of sovereign powers, the Declaration specifies 
that the rights it contains cannot be used to undermine the ‘territorial integrity 
or political unity’ of the state in which indigenous peoples reside (Art. 46; see 
also Larking 2014, 145). 
Despite the fact that the principle of sovereignty provides only heavily qualif-
ied support for political self-determination, it retains powerful normative 
appeal as a mechanism to ensure some degree of respect for political 
autonomy, self-government, and the collective right of members of states to 
freedom from overbearing control by imperial or alien powers. Consistently 
with this, sovereignty should act as a barrier to global tyranny, preventing the 
concentration of power in any one state or group of states.  
Recognising a Qualified Human Right to International Freedom of 
Movement
We have seen that an aspect of sovereignty is a state’s right to control the 
composition of its population and those who cross its borders. I want to 
suggest here that how this right is currently exercised does not advance the 
principle of political self-determination that provides normative justification for 
sovereignty. It is, moreover, fundamentally at odds with the aspirational 
claims of human rights, including the suggestion that ‘recognition of the 
inherent dignity and the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the 
51 Critical Perspectives on Migration in the Twenty-First Century
human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world’ 
(UDHR, preamble).
As things currently stand, the burden of hosting and caring for forced 
migrants is very unevenly shared. The vast majority are contained in their 
own countries or regions. The capacity of these countries and regions to 
‘freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development’ and ‘freely 
dispose of their natural wealth and resources’ (ICCPR and ICESCR, Art. 1) – 
and thus to be politically self-determining – is limited by the fact that they 
shoulder most of the costs of accommodating the world’s forced migrants.9 
This inequity is both produced and compounded by other forms of inequality 
within global institutions and regimes. Wealthy and powerful states strongly 
influence how international trade, finance and other governance regimes 
function, with the result that they benefit disproportionately from these 
regimes.10 Ensuring that these states support a larger share of the financial 
and social burden of resettling or otherwise assisting forced migrants would 
provide an incentive to make the international rules of engagement fairer. 
This would reduce the number of people forced to migrate in the first place. It 
would also promote the causes of political self-determination and genuinely 
universal human rights.
One major barrier to achieving more equitable burden-sharing in relation to 
forced migration – and thus to incentivising the creation of fairer global trade 
and finance regimes – is the perception within wealthy, rights-recognising 
states that according even a qualified right to international freedom of 
movement will undermine social conditions for current citizens. Very large, 
unregulated influxes of people entering a country in a short space of time do 
place pressure on social infrastructure, but research suggests that the long-
term economic benefits of immigration either outweigh the costs or are cost 
neutral, and moreover, that immigration may be necessary to fuel the 
economies of post-industrial states with ageing populations.11 Globally and 
within many countries, wealth and income inequalities have reached 
historically unprecedented levels (see Alston 2015, paras 8–9, 10, 35 and 
37). These inequalities impede economic growth and pose greater dangers 
for social cohesion than the challenges posed by even large-scale migration. 
Members of wealthy, rights-recognising states must confront what are 
genuine threats to their lifestyle, rights and culture. These threats do not stem 
directly from forced migration, but from global inequalities combined with the 
9  See Hansen 2017, 12–3. The discussion primarily concerns refugees but also 
refers more generally to displaced populations.
10  See Joseph 2007; George 2004, 53ff. and 57ff.; and Pahuja 2014. 
11  See OECD 2014 and Koser 2007, ch.7, ‘The economic impact of immigration’.
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corrosive effects on the rule of law within states from designating forced 
migrants as unlawfully present and denying them equal recognition and 
protection under the law. The proposition endorsed by the US Supreme Court 
that ‘Congress may make rules as to aliens that would be unacceptable if 
applied to citizens’12 is at odds with the idea that even democratically elected 
parliaments are bound by rule of law principles. It contradicts the 
‘revolutionary principle of equality’ that Hannah Arendt argues must support 
and legitimate government in all rights-recognising states.13 Governance in 
accordance with the rule of law requires that laws are capable of impartial 
application and do not single out particular groups, including non-citizens, for 
punitive measures. Building border fences, denying entry, and creating zones 
of exclusion does not dissolve this problem because border regimes must be 
administered within the framework of the law, regardless of whether the law is 
state-based or regional. If democratic states disavow their commitment to a 
foundational law of equality, they accept the idea that some people have an 
innate or inherent right to govern. Historically, this idea justified the rule of the 
monarchy, but it can also be used to justify the rule of larger collectives, as in 
Hitler’s claim that ‘right is what is good for the German people’ (see Larking 
2004, 16; 2014, 45). Who counts as a member of ‘the people’ is endlessly 
contestable and revisable. Recognising the threat posed to their own rights by 
the refusal to accord rights to unwelcome outsiders, privileged individuals 
who are members of rights-recognising states and who inhabit Castles’s top 
tiers of the citizenship hierarchy must mobilise in support of fairer global rules 
of institutional engagement, combined with a right to international freedom of 
movement for all forced migrants.14 
These mobilisations could be supported by the advocacy of states in the 
global south whose members are currently disadvantaged by global trade and 
finance regimes, and by the failure in international human rights instruments 
and migration frameworks to accord even a qualified right to international 
freedom of movement. Coalition building among these states and their 
members, and between them and concerned citizens of wealthy rights-
recognising states, would recognise their shared interests. It would promote 
the ideals of political self-determination and of human rights shared and 
enjoyed by ‘all members of the human family’.
12  Demore v Kim 538 U.S. 510 (2003) 11, in Wilsher 2012; and see Larking 2016, 197. 
13  This principle must be protected by ‘the complete impartiality of the law’ (see Arendt 
1968, 11 and 91, and my discussion in Larking 2014, 29–35 and 165–7).
14  Previously I have argued in support of a right to international freedom of movement 
only for victims of genocide, but supplemented by obligations on wealthy rights-
recognising states to share the burden of resettling or otherwise supporting all forced 
migrants (Larking 2012; 2014). In Refugees and the Myth of Human Rights I suggested 
obligations in relation to forced migrants who are not victims of genocide could be 
spelled out in a multilateral resettlement treaty (2014, 164–5).
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